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Abstract
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linearity with respect to gross income, which is observed by the government and used as
a tax base, is lost. A reduced-form optimal income tax problem is derived, in which con-
sumption levels are obtained as functions of gross incomes. The contribution of this new
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a simple way. Second, comparative static results with respect to individual productivities
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper uses a reduced form of the optimal non-linear income tax problem to derive a geo-
metric characterization of the social optimum in the gross-income/consumption space as well as
comparative static properties. Following Guesnerie and Seade (1982) and Weymark (1987), it
considers a nite population version of Mirrlees (1971)'s model. All individuals have the same
preferences over consumption and leisure, but differ in skill levels. The government wants to
redistribute income from the more to the less productive individuals. However, if the distribu-
tion of this parameter within the population is common knowledge, each agent's productivity is
private information. Accordingly, the government is restricted to setting taxes as a function of
earnings and faces an adverse selection problem when designing the optimal income tax sched-
ule.
The optimal tax structure is the product of different sorts of interacting inuences. It basi-
cally depends on the skill distribution (Diamond, 1998, Saez, 2001), on the government's aver-
sion to income inequality, reected by the welfare weights in the social objective function, but
also on the responsiveness of labour supply. In addition, the way in which all these inuences
interact is affected both by the incentive-compatibility constraints and the tax revenue constraint,
which restrict the possibilities for income redistribution. Because of the complexity of the rela-
tionship between the optimal tax schedule and the set of underlying parameters, investigations
must usually resort to numerical simulations (Tuomala, 1990). This is an unfortunate state of
affairs because some features of the model are necessarily left somewhat obscure by such an
approach, which is very useful since it allows the optimal tax rates to be quantied, but is not
ideally suited for shedding light on the economic intuition behind the results.
In a pioneering paper, Weymark (1987) has derived a number of comparative static results
of optimal non-linear income taxes for the case in which individual preferences are quasilinear
in leisure and the population is discrete. Their derivation uses a reduced form of the optimal
tax problem, which does only involve the choice of the consumption good (Weymark, 1986b)
and concentrates on the fully separating social allocation distinguished from those involving
bunching in Weymark (1986a). This methodology has been adapted to obtain comparative static
properties for a model in which the government both designs an optimal income tax and provides
a public good optimally (Brett and Weymark, 2004). The assumption that individual preferences
are quasilinear in leisure is maintained in this paper. The disutility of effort is therefore constant.
In other words, when a price is varied, the change in individual consumption does only depend on
the substitution effect while all income effects are absorbed by the labour supply. This preference
specication has also been employed to derive an explicit solution to the optimal income tax
problem with a continuous population (Lollivier and Rochet, 1983), the properties of which have
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been investigated by Boadway, Cuff, and Marchand (2000) and Boone and Bovenberg (2007).
Hamilton and Pestieau (2005) have used it to derive some comparative static results with respect
to individual productivity in an economywith two classes of agents where the government adopts
a maximin or maximax objective function. Its tractability has been exploited by Ebert (1992)
to provide a complete example in which different types of individuals are bunched together,
establishing that the rst-order approach to Mirrlees (1971)'s model can be misleading.
Quasilinear-in-leisure preferences offer technical advantages. They are indeed linear with
respect to gross income, i.e. to the variable observed by the government and used as the tax
base. This allows the reduced-form optimal income tax problem to have an explicit solution
(Weymark, 1986b). When quasilinear-in-consumption preferences are considered, the linearity
with respect to the observable variable is lost, the social objective of the reduced-form depends
on productivity through the disutility of labour and its maximization does not yield an explicit
solution.
Although working with them is less tractable, quasilinear-in-consumption preferences are
worth examining for at least three reasons. First, from the theoretical viewpoint, assuming that
all income effects are absorbed by consumption is a more satisfying assumption. Otherwise,
as is made clear in the continuous population framework, the optimal tax schedule does only
depend on the skill distribution and on the social weights (Boadway, Cuff, and Marchand, 2000),
but not on the labour response. The efciency/rent-extraction trade-off reected by the income
tax schedule is thus very specic. On the contrary, when the income effects on the labour
supply are omitted, the optimal tax scheme basically depends on the elasticity of the labour
supply as well. Second, most of the empirical studies, though not all, gives credence to small
income effects relative to substitution effects as regards labour supply (Blundell, 1992, Blundell
and MaCurdy, 1999). Accordingly, the case with no income effects on labour supply provides
a useful benchmark, which has been theoretically studied by Atkinson (1990), Boadway and
Pestieau (2007), d'Autume (2000), Diamond (1998), Piketty (1997), Salanié (1998) or Saez
(2002) and used in the numerical part of other papers (Saez, 2001). Third, the comparative static
properties of the optimal non-linear income tax problem could differ signicantly from those
obtained under quasilinear-in-leisure preferences.
This paper derives a reduced-form optimal non-linear income tax problem involving only
the allocation of gross incomes within the population. Consumption levels are thus obtained
as a function of gross incomes. This reduced form can be seen as a special case of Chambers
(1989) "concentrated" objective function derived for separable preferences. However, thanks to
our quasilinearity assumption, it clearly reects the trade-off between equity and efciency. On
the one hand, it incorporates the fact that the only incentive-compatibility constraints which mat-
ter are the downward adjacent ones. Accordingly, in the optimum, each individual is indifferent
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between his own bundle and that of his nearest less productive neighbour. This is in accordance
with the optimality features derived in the principal/agent model and reects efciency consid-
erations. On the other hand, at any given gross-income/consumption bundle, the angle between
the indifference curve of the individual for whom the bundle is designed and the indifference
curve of the nearest more productive individual is entirely determined by the social weights. Al-
together, these features allow a very simple geometric characterization of the optimal allocation
and of the bunching pattern. In particular, it is sufcient to know the indifference curves and
the individual social weights to construct the complete optimal allocation geometrically. The
reduced form is then used to provide the comparative statics of the optimal tax schedule with
respect to the marginal utility of money and the weights in the welfare function, as in Weymark
(1987), but also to individual productivity. It appears that varying the skill level of an individual
only alters the optimal allocation locally, through three channels: it involves a local substitution
effect, an incentive effect and an informational externality which modies the behaviour of the
nearest less productive individual.
This analysis can be regarded as a special case but also as a generalization of Stiglitz (1982)'s
model. First, it investigates quasilinear preferences instead of well-behaved generic preferences
and focuses on the maximization of social weighted functions rather than characterizing Pareto
efcient tax schedules. This latter restriction amounts to investigating the case Stiglitz (1982)
refers to as "normal" as soon as the individual social weights are declining with individual pro-
ductivity. Second, it casts light on a population consisting of more than two classes of individu-
als, which is of interest for the applicability of the model to real situations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 derives the reduced
form of the optimal non-linear income tax problem and provides a geometric characterization of
the optimal allocation. Section 4 examines the comparative statics of the solution to the optimal
income tax problem. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
The population consists of I  2 individuals, indexed by i 2 I := f1; :::; Ig : There are two
goods, consumption and leisure. Person i's consumption and labour supply are denoted xi and
`i, respectively. The economy is competitive, with constant-returns-to-scale technology; so per-
son i's wage rate is xed and equal to his productivity θi: For convenience, only one person
has a given productivity level. Individuals are thus indexed in terms of productivity. This sim-
plication is not particularly restrictive as the distance between two productivity levels is free
to vary. Without loss of generality, the vector of productivities θ := (θ1; :::;θI) is taken to be
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monotonically increasing,
0< θ1 < ::: < θI: (1)
An individual with productivity θi working `i units of time has gross income
zi := θi`i; i 2I : (2)
All individuals have the same preferences over consumption and leisure, represented by the
utility functionU : R2+! R,
U (xi; `i) := γxi  v(`i) ; i 2I ; (3)
where γ 2 R++ is the marginal utility of money. It is assumed that the disutility of labour v(`i)
is a C 3-function which satises v0 > 0; v00 > 0; v000 > 0; v(0) = 0; v0 (0) = 0; and v0
 
`
! ∞
where ` is the time endowment of each individual.
By (2), the utility function (3) can be rewritten asU (xi; `i) =U (xi;zi=θi) : Individuals have
therefore personalized utility functions u : R2+! R in the gross-income/consumption space,
u(xi;zi;θi) := γxi  v

zi
θi

; i 2I : (4)
The marginal rate of substitution s(zi;θi) of the θi-individual at the (xi;zi)-bundle only depends
on gross income, with
s(zi;θi) := 
u0zi (xi;zi;θi)
u0xi (xi;zi;θi)
=
v0 (zi=θi)
γθi
; i 2I : (5)
In particular, the higher is γ; the atter are the indifference curves and thus the lower is the
increase in consumption required to compensate for an increase in gross income while keeping
utility constant.
A social allocation species the consumption and gross income levels for each individual. It
is represented by a vector a= (x;z) 2 RI+RI+, with x= (x1; :::;xI) and z= (z1; :::;zI). The tax
policymaker knows the functional form of the utility function and the distribution of wages in
the population. He is however unable to observe each individual's productivity. As a result, he is
restricted to setting taxes as a function of gross income zi. By the taxation principle, a non-linear
income tax schedule is therefore a mapping(
θ  ! a R+R+
θi (xi;zi) ;
(6)
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which satises the incentive compatibility constraints
u(xi;zi;θi) u(x j;z j;θi) ; 8(i; j) 2I 2; (7)
and the tax revenue constraint
I
∑
i=1
zi 
I
∑
i=1
xi: (8)
An allocation a is production efcient if the budget-balanced constraint (8) is binding.
The social welfare function W : RI+RI+! R is a weighted sum of individual utilities,
W (a) :=
I
∑
i=1
λiu(xi;zi;θi) ; (9)
in which λ := (λ1; :::;λI) are individual social weights. The tax policymaker's taste for redistri-
bution from the high to the low productive individuals is captured through the requirement that
the higher the individual productivity the less the weight in the social objective, i.e.
0< λI < ::: < λ1: (10)
If I = 2; this assumption amounts to considering the "normal" case studied by Stiglitz (1982)
in which only the incentive compatibility constraint of the high type is binding. When I > 2,
one can therefore expect that the only binding incentive compatibility constraints will be the
downward adjacent ones stating that the θi+1-individual must be indifferent between his own
bundle and that of the θi-individual, for i= 1; :::; I 1:
AsW (a) is homogeneous of degree one in λ , the sum of the social weights can be normal-
ized without loss of generality. It is convenient to dene Λ(θi) as the cumulative social weight
of the i less productive individuals, and to set
Λ(θI) = I: (11)
Consequently, admissible parameters (θ ;γ;λ ) belong to the set
P := RI++R++fλ j(10) and (11) are satisedg : (12)
The optimal non-linear income tax problem can thus be formulated as follows:
Problem 1 (Optimal Non-linear Income Tax Problem). For (θ ;γ;λ )2P; choose an allocation
a 2 RI+RI+ to maximize W (a) under the self-selection constraints (7) and the tax revenue
constraint (8).
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For xed values of the parameters (θ ;γ;λ ) 2P , there is a unique solution to Problem 1.
I denote by gx :P ! RI+ and gz :P ! RI the functions which relate (θ ;γ;λ ) to the optimal
consumption and gross income vectors for Problem 1 respectively, with
gx (θ ;γ;λ ) := (gx1 (θ ;γ;λ ) ; ::: ;gxI (θ ;γ;λ )) ; (13)
gz (θ ;γ;λ ) := (gz1 (θ ;γ;λ ) ; ::: ;g
z
I (θ ;γ;λ )) : (14)
The indirect utilities Vi :P ! R are thus obtained as
Vi (θ ;γ;λ ) := u(gxi (θ ;γ;λ ) ;gzi (θ ;γ;λ ) ;θi) ; i 2I : (15)
3. THE REDUCED-FORM PROBLEM
The optimal non-linear income tax problem involves two sets of control variables, gross income
z and net income x: It can however be transformed into a reduced-form problem in which the
policymaker chooses only one of these variables. The reduced-form problem makes it easier to
interpret the social value function, to interpret the optimality conditions and to derive compar-
ative static results. For this purpose, Problem 1 is separated into two subproblems. In the rst
one, gross income is arbitrarily chosen within the set of incentive-feasible gross income levels
Z .
Subproblem 1. Given a gross income vector z 2Z and the parameters (θ ;γ;λ ) 2P; choose
the consumption vector x 2 RI+ to maximize the social welfare function W (a) subject to the
self-selection constraints (7) and the tax revenue constraint (8).
LetX  (z;θ ;γ;λ ) be the set of maximizers. Then, if there is a unique consumption vector
x (z;θ ;γ;λ ) inX  (z;θ ;γ;λ ), the solution in z to Problem 1 is obtained as
argmax
z2Z
W (x (z;θ ;γ;λ ) ;z) : (16)
So, the reduced-form problem can be stated as follows.
Subproblem 2. Given the parameters (θ ;γ;λ ) 2P; choose z 2 Z to maximize the social
welfare function W (x (z;θ ;γ;λ ) ;z).
For this two-stage reasoning to hold, it remains to clarify why all implications of the self-
selection constraints, except z 2Z , are taken into account in Subproblem 1 and to establish that
the function x (z;θ ;γ;λ ) is unique and differentiable.
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3.1. Implications of the Self-Selection Constraints
The self-selection constraints (7) place structure on the solution to Problem 1. Indeed, incentive
compatibility of the income tax schedule requires the indirect utility to increase at a specic
rate and the gross income to be non-decreasing in productivity. These restrictions can be used
to derive sufcient conditions under which an allocation a satises the incentive-compatibility
constraints (7). We proceed in two steps.
First, if an allocation a satises (7), then gross income and net incomemust be non-decreasing
in productivity, i.e.
(x1;z1) ::: (xI;zI) ; (17)
with (xi 1;zi 1)< (xi;zi) if (xi 1;zi 1) 6= (xi;zi) ; i= 2; :::; I: Therefore, the set Z in which the
solution in z to Problem 1 must lie is dened as
Z :=

z 2 RIj0 z1  ::: zI
	
: (18)
The condition that z belongs toZ corresponds to the second-order condition for incentive com-
patibility derived in the continuum model.
Second, given z 2 Z , a sufcient condition for an allocation to satisfy the incentive com-
patibility constraints (7) employs the concept of simple monotonic chain to the left. Following
Guesnerie and Seade (1982), a simple monotonic chain to the left is an allocation a such that
u(xi+1;zi+1;θi+1) = u(xi;zi;θi+1) ; i= 1; :::; I 1: (19)
Given quasilinear-in-consumption preferences, (19) is equivalent to
u(xi+1;zi+1;θi+1) u(xi;zi;θi) = v

zi
θi

  v

zi
θi+1

: (20)
In words, the adjacent downward incentive compatibility constraints are active for all i= 2; :::; I.
Proposition 1. Let an allocation a 2 RI+RI+ be a simple monotonic chain to the left and
z 2Z : Then a satises the incentive compatibility constraints (7).
Proof. Guesnerie and Seade (1982).
This pattern expresses a specic efciency/rent-extraction trade-off. Indeed, (20) expressed
at which rate utility must be increased for the tax schedule to induce individual truthtelling. For
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each pair of adjacent productivity levels (θi;θi+1) ; this rate basically depends on
Ri+1 := v

zi
θi

  v

zi
θi+1

; i= 1; :::; I 1; (21)
which may be regarded as the marginal rent the policymaker has to leave to the more productive
individuals because of the informational externality. Consequently, (20) constitutes the discrete
analogue of the rst-order condition for incentive compatibility obtained in the models with a
continuum of individuals.
3.2. Optimal Consumption Given Fixed Levels of Income
The properties of the solution in x to Subproblem 1 are now investigated. The next lemma
establishes that there exist solutions to Subproblem 1 for all gross income vector z 2Z and all
(θ ;γ;λ ) 2P . In addition, each of them is a simple monotonic chain to the left for which the
tax revenue constraint (8) is binding.
Lemma 1. Given z 2Z and (θ ;γ;λ ) 2P; there is at least one solution to Subproblem 1 and
any allocation a = (x;z) where x 2X  (z;θ ;γ;λ ) ; is a simple monotonic chain to the left
which is production efcient.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The implications are twofold. First, combined with Proposition 1, Lemma 1 ensures that
all implications of the incentive-compatibility constraints (7) are embedded in any solution to
Subproblem 1, provided z 2Z . Second, the fact that a is a simple monotonic chain to the left
gives rise to a specic consumption pattern. Indeed, by (19),
xi = xi 1+
1
γ

v

zi
θi

  v

zi 1
θi

; i= 2; :::; I; (22)
and so
xi = x1+
1
γ
i
∑
j=2

v

z j
θ j

  v

z j 1
θ j

; i= 2; :::; I: (23)
As any solution to Subproblem 1 is production efcient, by Lemma 1, the binding tax revenue
constraint (8) can be substituted in ∑Ii=1 xi; obtained from (23), to get
I
∑
i=1
zi = Ix1+
1
γ
I
∑
i=2
i
∑
j=2

v

z j
θ j

  v

z j 1
θ j

= Ix1+
1
γ
I
∑
i=2
(I+1  i)

v

zi
θi

  v

zi 1
θi

:
(24)
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This equation admits a unique solution in x1: Substituting the latter in (23) and proceeding
sequentially show that there is a unique consumption vector in X  (z;θ ;γ;λ ), which is inde-
pendent of the social weights λ and inherits the differentiability properties of v:
Proposition 2. Given z 2Z and (θ ;γ;λ ) 2P; the unique function solution to Subproblem 1
is twice continuously differentiable, dened by x :Z RI++R++! RI+ with
x1 (z;θ ;γ) =
1
I
(
I
∑
j=1
z j  1γ
I
∑
j=2
(I+1  j)

v

z j
θ j

  v

z j 1
θ j
)
; (25)
xi (z;θ ;γ) = x1 (z;θ ;γ)+
1
γ
i
∑
j=2

v

z j
θ j

  v

z j 1
θ j

; i= 2; :::; I: (26)
3.3. The Reduced Form
We can now take stock of the previous results to give a more compact formulation of Sub-
problem 2. For this purpose, it is convenient to introduce the new vector of social parameters
β = (β1; :::;βI) with
βi := Λ(θi)  i; i 2I : (27)
Because of (10) and (11), the graph of i!Λ(θi) is hump-shaped and above the 45-line. Hence,
βi > 0 for all i= 1; :::; I 1:
The parameters βi summarize in a transparent way the redistributive taste of the government.
First, all λi would be equal if the government adopted pure utilitarianism as a social objective.
In this case, βi = 0 for every i: Consequently, the social parameters βi express the policymaker's
strict aversion to income inequality. Second, to get further insight into βi; it is instructive to
consider the effects of the government's decision to give each of the i less productive individuals
one extra euro of consumption. Since γ is the marginal utility of money, the utility of each
of them is increased by γ: Accordingly, the gross social benet amounts to γΛi (θi) : However,
the tax revenue is decreased by i euros, which corresponds to a social cost γi: Summing both
effects, it appears that γβi is the net social benet of marginally increasing the consumption of
the i less skilled individuals. So, βi is this net social benet expressed in monetary units. Third,
the parameters βi can alternatively be dened as
βi := I  i 
I
∑
j=i+1
λ j; i= 1; :::; I 1; (28)
and βI = 0; because Λ(θI) = I. They thus also corresponds to the net social cost, expressed in
euros, of marginally increasing the consumption of the I  i most productive individuals. That
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is why they are henceforth referred to as net cumulative social weights. They allow us to rewrite
the reduced-form optimal non-linear income tax problem (i.e. Subproblem 2) as follows.
Problem 2 (Reduced Form). For (θ ;γ;λ ) 2P , choose z in Z so as to maximize the social
objective function W  (z;θ ;γ;λ ) :Z P ! R, with1
W  (z;θ ;γ;λ ) :=
I
∑
i=1

γzi  v

zi
θi

 
I
∑
i=1
βiRi+1: (29)
This problem is called a reduced form of Problem 1 because the optimal solution in gross
income of the former, and the consumption pattern it generates through Proposition 2, are the
optimal solutions of the latter.
Proposition 3. For (θ ;γ;λ ) 2P , the optimal solution to Problem 2 is gz (θ ;γ;λ ), the gross
income vector solution to Problem 1, and the optimal consumption vector for Problem 1 is
gx (θ ;γ;λ ) = x (gz (θ ;γ;λ ) ;θ ;γ) : (30)
Proof. See the Appendix.
An important implication of Proposition 3 is that the social allocation solution to the optimal
non-linear income tax problem is a monotonic chain to the left. In consequence, the optimal tax
schedule is not differentiable at each observed gross income level zi: It is nevertheless possible
to use the differentiability of the indifference curves in order to dene implicit marginal tax
rates. Since at the optimum only the adjacent downward self-selection constraints are binding,
two implicit marginal tax rates are of particular interest at each observed gross income level zi :
the implicit marginal tax rate T 0 (zi;θi) faced by the θi-individual for whom the (xi (zi;θ ;γ) ;zi)-
bundle is designed, on the one hand, and the implicit marginal tax rate T 0 (zi;θi+1) the nearest
more productive θi+1-individual would face if he were mimicking the θi-individual. They are
formally dened as
T 0 (zi;θ j) := 1  s(zi;θ j) = 1  v
0 (zi=θ j)
γθ j
; (i; j) 2I 2: (31)
The implicit marginal tax rates allows us to get further understanding of the social objective
function of the reduced-form optimal income tax problemW  (z;θ ;γ;λ ) : Indeed, let z be a xed
gross income vector and consider that the gross income zi of the θi-individual is increased at the
1Since βI = 0; RI+1 is an arbitrary number.
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margin. As
∂W  (z;θ ;γ;λ )
∂ zi
= γT 0 (zi;θi) βi ∂Ri+1∂ zi ; i 2I ; (32)
by (29) and (31), the impact on social welfare may be thought of as proceeding in two steps.
In the rst step, the θi-individual pays T 0 (zi;θi) additional euros in taxes, which relaxes the tax
revenue constraint (8). As γ is the marginal utility of money, the positive effect on social welfare
amounts to γT 0 (zi;θi) : In the second step, the effect on incentives is taken into account. The θi-
individual receives 1 T 0 (zi;θi) extra euro of consumption. As a result, the I  imore productive
individuals have to sacrice less consumption when they decide to mimic the θi-individual. So,
cheating becomes more attractive to them. In order to restore individual truthtelling and obtain
a new monotonic chain to the left, the policymaker has to increase the marginal information rent
left to each of them by 1γ
∂Ri+1
∂ zi euros. Because γβi is the net social cost of marginally increasing
the consumption of the I  i most productive individuals, social welfare is reduced by βi ∂Ri+1∂ zi : If
the social optimum is interior, it is therefore obtained when the positive effect on social welfare
due to the relaxation of the tax revenue constraint offsets the negative one stemming from private
information, i.e.
∂W  (z;θ ;γ;λ )
∂ zi
= 0, T 0 (zi;θi) = βiγ
∂Ri+1
∂ zi
; i 2I ; (33)
whose sign is given by βi because γ > 0 and ∂Ri+1=∂ zi> 0: Consequently, as βi> 0 for i< I and
βI = 0; the optimal marginal tax rates T 0 (zi;θi) faced by all but the most productive individuals
is strictly positive. The labour supply is thus distorted except at the top.
3.4. Characterization of the Social Optimum
Characterizing the social optimum requires to know whether it involves bunching or is fully
separating. If the solution z= gz (θ ;γ;λ ) to Problem 2 is such that 0< z1 < ::: < zI; then it must
satisfy (33). Using (31), (32) and (21), this is equivalent to
zi = α 1i (1=βi;θ ;γ) ; i= 1; :::; I 1; (34)
where
αi (zi;θ ;γ) =
T 0 (zi;θi+1) T 0 (zi;θi)
T 0 (zi;θi)
; i= 1; :::; I 1; (35)
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FIGURE 1: Geometric interpretation of the rst-order conditions: at the optimum and at the
(xi;zi)-bundle, the angle αi between the indifference curves i and i+ 1 of the θi and θi+1-
individual respectively is determined by the cumulative social weights βi.
and zI = θI (v0) 1 (γθI) : As αi (zi;θ ;γ) is a strictly increasing function of zi2, zi is a strictly
decreasing function of βi; with zi = α 1i (1=βi;θ ;γ). Hence, 0 < z1 < ::: < zI is possible if and
only if 0< βI < ::: < β1:
Proposition 4. The optimal allocation is fully separating if and only
(θ ;γ;λ ) 2P0 := f(θ ;γ;λ ) 2Pj0< βI < ::: < β1g : (36)
This necessary and sufcient condition has a very clear interpretation. Bunching does not
occur when giving one euro to each of the i less productive individuals is socially more effective
than giving one euro to each of the i+ 1 less productive ones, for i = 1; :::; I  1: This corre-
sponds to an additional restriction on the individual social weights λi: From now on, attention is
restricted to the case where this restriction is met. The optimality condition can then be written
in a strikingly simple form.
Proposition 5. For (θ ;γ;λ ) 2P0; z is socially optimal if and only if
αi (zi;θ ;γ) =
1
βi
; i= 1; :::; I 1; (37)
2As d [T 0 (zi;θi+1) T 0 (zi;θi)]=dzi = 1γ
h
v00(zi=θi)
θ 2i
  v00(zi=θi+1)θ 2i+1
i
> 0 while dT 0 (zi;θi)=dzi < 0; (35) implies
dαi (zi;θ ;γ)=dzi > 0 for i= 1; :::; I 1:
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and T 0 (zI;θI) = 0:
For a gross income zi; αi (zi;θ ;γ) tells us to which extent the indifference curves of the θi+1-
individual must be atter than those of the θi-individual. Geometrically, it thus corresponds to
the angle between the tangents to the indifference curves of the θi and θi+1-individuals depicted
in Figure 1. This angle is closely related to the single-crossing condition and thus henceforth re-
ferred to as the Spence-Mirrlees angle. The single-crossing condition is a restriction on the sign
of αi (zi;θ ;γ) ; which must be strictly positive. Here, this condition is automatically satised
because individual preferences are quasilinear in consumption. The conditions for social opti-
mality (37) introduce an additional restriction on αi (zi;θ ;γ) : an allocation is socially optimal
only if, at each observed gross income level zi, the Spence-Mirrlees angle is entirely determined
by the exogenously given cumulative social weight βi: In addition, the labour supply of the more
productive individuals is not distorted since the marginal tax rate at the top is equal to zero.
Thanks to Proposition 5, the optimal allocation can be constructed geometrically in two
steps illustrated in Figure 2. In the rst step, the tax revenue constraint is ignored. Starting from
zero, gross income is gradually increased until α1 = 1=β1 and the bundle (x1;z1) is determined.
Then, gross income is increased along the indifference curve of the θ2-individual through the
(x1;z1)-bundle until the angle with the indifference curve of the θ3-individual is equal to 1=β2:
Proceeding recursively, a monotonic chain to the left (x;z) is obtained. This allocation is incen-
tive compatible, but not necessarily budget-balanced. That is why, in the second step, each xi is
varied by a same amount ε so as to get a binding tax revenue constraint. The resulting allocation
(x+ ε;z) ; which is both incentive compatible and production efcient, is socially optimal.
Before going further and derive comparative static properties, it is instructive to examine one
main source of differences between our results and those derived in Weymark (1986a,b, 1987).
In the latter papers, the quasilinear-in-leisure utility function u(xi;zi;θi) := h(xi)  γzi=θi is
replaced by its monotone transform eu(xi;zi;θi) = θih(xi)  γzi in order to sum eu(xi;zi;θi) over
all i in I , get
I
∑
i=1
eu(xi;zi;θi) = I∑
i=1
θih(xi)  γ
I
∑
i=1
zi; (38)
and replace ∑Ii=1 zi by ∑Ii=1 xi: This step is required to obtain a reduced-form optimal income tax
problem. Consequently, skill-normalized social weights eλi := λi=θi are used in the social objec-
tive ∑Ii=1eλieu(xi;zi;θi) : The rst-order conditions of the reduced-form problem involve therefore
skilled-normalized cumulative social weights∑ij=1eλ j instead of Λi. So, the impact of the policy-
maker's taste for redistribution is less transparent because social weights and productivity levels
are mixed together.
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FIGURE 2: Two-step geometric construction of the optimal allocation. Step 1: the simple
monotonic chain to the left (x;z) is obtained by setting αi = 1=βi for i = 1;2 and choosing
z3 such that the θ3-individual is not taxed at the margin. Step 2 : (x;z) is translated by (0;ε) so
as to obtain a production efcient allocation.
4. COMPARATIVE STATIC PROPERTIES
Besides providing a geometric interpretation of the optimality conditions, the reduced form
makes it possible to derive comparative static results of the optimal income tax allocation. For
this purpose, it is rst necessary to examine the differentiability properties of the main variables.
Since the disutility of labour v is C 2, the implicit function theorem implies that gzi (θ ;γ;λ ) is C 1:
It thus follows from Proposition 2 that gxi (θ ;γ;λ ) = x (g
z
i (θ ;γ;λ ) ;θ ;γ;λ ) is also C 1: These
results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 6. The functions gx; gz; T 0 and V are C 1 at every (θ ;γ;λ ) inP0:
The effects of changing an underlying parameter at the margin can now be investigated.
4.1. Comparative Statics for the Marginal Utility of Money
The marginal utility of money corresponds to the unit of count in welfare of our economy.
Namely, one additional euro of consumption for a given individual increases his well-being by
γ utils. Varying γ at the margin is thus likely to modify the individual labour supply.
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Proposition 7. For (θ ;γ;λ ) 2P0 and i 2I ;
∂gzi (θ ;γ;λ )
∂γ
> 0: (39)
Proof. See the Appendix.
A small increase in the marginal utility of money γ raises the gross income of every indi-
vidual. Indeed, when γ goes up, an extra unit of consumption contributes more to individual
well-being as previously. So, the indifference curves become atter in the (z;x)-space. Every θi-
individual is thus willing to work more in order to increase his consumption by a given amount.
Unfortunately, the comparative statics of the optimal implicit marginal tax rates cannot be
obtained in the general case. In fact, as T 0 (zi;θ j) = 1  v0 (zi=θ j)=(γθ j) ; the reduction in 1=γ
goes in the opposite direction to the associated increase in gross income.
4.2. Comparative Statics for Individual Productivities
Varying the skill levels has more subtle effects on the optimal allocation. This is of particular
interest since productivities are probably the most basic ingredients of the Mirrleesian optimal
income tax model. They are indeed the sole source of heterogeneity within the population and
give rise to the adverse selection problem which is the key of Mirrleesian income taxation. The
fact that the productivity vector θ is strictly monotonically increasing ensures that (1) remains
satised once a given individual productivity is changed at the margin. The effects of a variation
in θi+1 can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 8. For (θ ;γ;λ ) 2P0 and (i; j) 2 f1; :::; I 1gI ;
∂T 0 (zi;θi)
∂θi+1
> 0;
∂T 0 (zi;θi+1)
∂θi+1
> 0; (40)
∂T 0 (zi+1;θi+1)
∂θi+1
< 0;
∂T 0 (zi+1;θi+2)
∂θi+1
< 0; (41)
∂T 0 (z j;θ j)
∂θi+1
=
∂T 0 (z j;θ j+1)
∂θi+1
= 0 for j =2 fi; i+1g ; (42)
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and
∂ zi
∂θi+1
< 0; (43)
∂ zi+1
∂θi+1
> 0; (44)
∂ z j
∂θi+1
= 0 for j =2 fi; i+1g ; (45)
where z gz (θ ;γ;λ ) :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Increasing the productivity of the θi+1-individual does only alter his gross income and that
of his nearest less productive neighbour. Indeed, by Proposition 5, only αi and αi+1 depend on
θi+1: So, the optimality condition α j = 1=β j, which implicitly denes z j as a function of θi+1;
is unaffected except for the θi and θi+1-individuals. Accordingly, the gross income levels of
all other individuals remain unaltered. As regards the θi and θi+1-individuals, the adjustment
process combines three effects.
First, the variation in θi+1 gives rise to a local substitution effect. The increase in the pro-
ductivity of the θi+1-individual results in a rise in his net-of-tax wage rate, which leads him to
increase his labour supply in efciency units, zi+1:
Second, changing θi+1 has an incentive effect. As he becomes more efcient, the θi+1-
individual has to provide less effort if he wants to imitate the θi-individual. Consequently, his
indifference curve through the gross-income/consumption bundle of the θi-individual attens.
This corresponds to an increase in the implicit marginal tax rate T 0 (xi;zi;θi+1) he would face if
he were cheating.
Third, the θi-individual incurs an informational externality induced by the incentive effect.
Since the cumulative social weight βi is unaltered, the angle αi between the indifference curves
of the θi and θi+1-individuals through the (xi;zi)-bundle must stay constant (Proposition 5).
Consequently, the increase in T 0 (xi;zi;θi+1) must be associated with an increase in the implicit
marginal tax rate T 0 (xi;zi;θi) and thus with a reduction in the net-of-tax wage rate of the θi-
individual. Finally, the substitution effect leads the θi-individual to work less.
The changes in gross income ensure that a new monotonic chain to the left is obtained.
However, this incentive-compatible allocation is not necessarily budget-balanced. Therefore,
in a second step, the consumption levels are adjusted in order to obtain a production-efcient
allocation. However, the comparative static results as regards consumption cannot be derived in
the general case.
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4.3. Comparative Statics for the Social Weights
The geometric characterization of the solution to the optimal income tax problem found in
Proposition 5 basically involves the cumulative social weights βi, and thus the individual so-
cial weights λi: As emphasized previously, these social weights express the government's strict
aversion to income inequality. Changing them marginally is thus likely to alter the progressivity
of the tax schedule.
The impact of a change in the cumulative social weight β , with i < I3; is examined rst
because it will be useful when deriving the comparative statics with respect to the individual
social weights. As zi = α 1i (1=βi;γ;λ ) where α 0i > 0; an increase in βi is associated with a
reduction in zi: Indeed, given T 0 (zi;θi+1) ; an increase in βi requires the implicit marginal tax
rate T 0 (zi;θi) faced by the θi-individual to be raised. The induced substitution effect leads the
θi-individual to work less.
Proposition 9. For (θ ;γ;λ ) 2P0 and (i; j) 2 f1; :::; I 1gI with i 6= j;
∂gzi (θ ;γ;λ )
∂βi
< 0 and
∂gzj (θ ;γ;λ )
∂βi
= 0 (46)
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result can now be used to consider the impact of an increase in the individual social
weight of the θi-individual to the detriment of a more productive θ j-individual. By denition
of Λ(θk) ; every βk is increased for k 2 fi; :::; j 1g while all other βk remain unaltered. By
Proposition 9, it is thus optimal to decrease the gross income zk of each θk-individual, with
k 2 fi; :::; j 1g ; and to hold that of the others constant. The impact on the consumption levels
and indirect utilities can also be signed for all k =2 fi; :::; j 1g :
Proposition 10. Let

θ ;γ;λ

2P0; i 2 f1; :::; I 1g and j 2 fi+1; :::; Ig : Let λ : S! RI;
where S= ( 1;1) ; be C 1 with8><>:
λk (0) = λ k; k = i; j;
λk (s) λ k; 8s 2 S; 8k 6= i; j;
dλi (s)=ds= dλ j (s)=ds; 8s 2 S:
(47)
3A change in βI is impossible since, by denition, βI  0:
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Then, if λi is increased to the detriment of λ j4,(
dzk=ds< 0; 8k 2 fi; :::; j 1g ;
dzk=ds= 0; 8k =2 fi; :::; j 1g ;
(48)(
dxk=ds> 0; 8k < i;
dxk=ds< 0; 8k  j;
(49)(
dVk=ds> 0; 8k < i;
dVk=ds< 0; 8k  j;
(50)
where z gz

θ ;γ;λ

and x  x  z;θ ;γ :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Before interpreting these results, it is worth examining the impact of this change in the social
weights on the implicit optimal marginal tax rates. By (31), they only depend on λ through
gross income z: It thus follows from (48) that T 0
 
xk ;zk;θk

and T 0
 
xk ;zk;θk+1

are unaltered for
k =2 fi; :::; j 1g whilst T 0  xk ;zk;θk and T 0  xk ;zk;θk+1 are increased for k 2 fi; :::; j 1g :
For concreteness, let us consider that the population consists of three individuals and that
the social weight of the θ2-individual is increased at the expense of the θ3-individual. Let (x;z)
be the initial allocation and denote by (x;z) the new one. The changes in gross income have
been explained previously. The adjustments in consumption can be thought of as proceeding
in two steps. In the rst step, the budget constraint (8) is left aside. By (48), the gross income
levels of the θ1 and θ3-individuals are held xed, i.e. z1 = z1 and z3 = z3; while z2 is reduced
(by dz2): In consequence, the requirement that the θ3-individual is indifferent between his own
bundle and that of the θ2-individual induces a decrease in the consumption levels x2 and x3 of
both more productive individuals (by  dx2 and  dx3 respectively) as well as in the indirect
utility of the θ3-individual. A new monotonic chain to the left is obtained. As the θ2-individual
faces a strictly positive marginal tax rate, he reduces his gross income by a smaller amount than
his consumption, i.e.  dx2 > dz2: So, dx3 can be sufciently small for
3
∑
i=1
xi dx2 dx3 <
3
∑
i=1
z dz2; (51)
which means that the new monotonic chain to the left is not production efcient. As ∑3i=1 xi =
4The inequalities in (48)(50) are reversed if λi is decreased to the benet of λ j:
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∑3i=1 z, the second step consists therefore in giving
ε =
1
3
(dx2+dx3 dz2)> 0 (52)
euros of consumption to each individual. The new consumption levels are thus the following:
x1 = x1+
1
3
(dx2+dx3 dz2)> x1; (53)
x2 = x2  23dx2+
1
3
(dx3 dz2) ; (54)
x3 = x3  23dx3+
1
3
(dx2 dz2)< x3: (55)
Hence, the θ1-individual enjoys greater consumption, contrary to the θ3-individual. The change
in the consumption of the θ2-individual is ambiguous. It is positive if and only if dz2 < dx3 
2dx2: The variations (50) in the indirect utilities directly follow from those in gross income and
consumption.
5. CONCLUSION
Thanks to the absence of income effects on labour supply, the trade-off between equity and ef-
ciency is very pure when individual preferences are quasilinear in consumption. This case has
been investigated in depth in the continuous population version of Mirrlees model (Atkinson
(1990), Diamond (1998), Piketty (1997), Salanié (1998) or d'Autume (2000)), but the analy-
sis carried out for a nite population has concentrated on the situation where preferences are
quasilinear in leisure. In this extent, the present paper contributes to lling this gap.
When preferences are quasilinear in consumption, it is not necessary to work with skilled-
normalized social weights. Therefore, the respective inuences of individual productivities and
social weights are easier to separate in the social objective function of the reduced-form optimal
income tax problem. This offers two advantages. First, the link between the social weights and
the conditions for social optimality is very transparent. Second, clear-cut comparative statics
properties can easily be derived as regards changes in the productivity levels which are the key
parameters of the optimal income tax model.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof proceeds in three steps.
(i) a is a simple monotonic chain to the left.
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The proof is ad absurdum. Assume a is not a simple monotonic chain to the left, i.e.
u

xj ;z j;θ j

6= u

xj 1;z j 1;θ j

: As u

xj ;z j;θ j

< u

xj 1;z j 1;θ j

implies u

xj ;z j;θ j

<
u

xj 1;z j 1;θ j 1

which violates (7), our assumption is equivalent to considering that there
exists j  2 for which
γxj   v

z j
θ j

> γxj 1  v

z j 1
θ j

: (56)
By (17), it must be xj > xj 1 and z j > z j 1 for (56) to be satised. If z does not satisfy the
second inequality, then (i) is established.
Let xi = xi + ε1 for i= 1; :::; j 1 and xi = xi   ε2 for i= j; :::; I; where ε1 > 0 and ε2 > 0:
The incentive compatibility constraints remain satised for sufciently small ε1 and ε2: ε1 and
ε2 are chosen such that x= x; i.e.
( j 1)ε1 = (I  j+1)ε2: (57)
Therefore, using (57), one gets:
W (x;z) W (x;z) = γ
I
∑
i=1
λi (xi  xi ) = γ
"
j 1
∑
i=1
λiε1 
I
∑
i= j
λiε2
#
; (58)
which can be minored thanks to (10):
W (x;z) W (x;z) γ [λ j 1 ( j 1)ε1 λ j (I  j+1)ε2]
= γ (I  j+1)ε2 [λ j 1 λ j]> 0: (59)
This contradicts the fact that x is inX  (z;θ ;γ;λ ) :
(ii) a is production efcient.
Fix z in Z . The self-selection constraints (7) are satised, with zi = zi and xi = xi for every
i 2 I : The proof proceeds by contradiction. Assume (8) is not binding. Hence, (8) remains
satised if all xi are increased by a sufciently small ε > 0: But the the self-selection constraints
(7) are equivalent to
γxi + γε  v

zi
θi

 γxj + γε  v

z j
θi

;8(i; j) 2I 2: (60)
Increasing every xi by ε is thus incentive compatible. Since it is also Pareto improving, x cannot
be inX  (z;θ ;γ;λ ) : A contradiction.
(iii) Existence of an optimal allocation.
Fix z in Z and pick an arbitrary value x1 for x1: Then, proceed sequentially to select x which
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solves
xi+1 = xi+
1
γ

v

zi+1
θi+1

  v

zi
θi+1

; i= 1; :::; I 1: (61)
By construction, a is a monotonic chain to the left. Since z 2Z , it follows from Proposition 1
that a satises (7). If a does not satisfy (8), it is sufcient to change each xi by a sufcient large
amount. If (8) is not binding, the argument used in (i) applies: it is sufcient to increase each xi
by a well-chosen ε > 0: Consequently, the constraint set is not empty.
Now, write (7) for j = 1 to obtain
γxi  v

zi
θi

 γx1  v

z1
θi

, γ [xi  x1] v

zi
θi

  v

z1
θi

 0; 8i 2I : (62)
Since x1  0; all xi are bounded from below. In addition, all xi must be bounded from above for
(8) to be binding. Consequently, if the setX  (z;θ ;γ;λ ) is non-empty, it is a bounded subset of
the feasible set.
Finally,W is continuous while the constraint set is compact (because the inequalities are weak)
and non-empty. Hence, by Weierstrass theorem,X  (z;θ ;γ;λ ) 6= /0.
Proof of Proposition 3. It is sufcient to establish that substitution of x (z;θ ;γ) into W yields
W  for all z 2Z : By (20),
u(xi ;zi;θi) = u
 
xi 1;zi 1;θi 1

+ v

zi 1
θi 1

  v

zi 1
θi

; i= 2; :::; I; (63)
from which
u(xi ;zi;θi) = u(x1;z1;θ1)+
i 1
∑
j=1

v

z j
θ j

  v

z j
θ j+1

; i= 2; :::; I: (64)
Consequently,
I
∑
i=1
u(xi ;zi;θi) = Iu(x1;z1;θ1)+
I 1
∑
i=1
(I  i)

v

zi
θi

  v

zi
θi+1

: (65)
In addition, summing (4) over i on I and employing (8),
I
∑
i=1
u(xi ;zi;θi) = γ
I
∑
i=1
zi 
I
∑
i=1
v

zi
θi

: (66)
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Plugging (66) in (65) and solving for u(x1;z1;θ1) ;
u(x1;z1;θ1) =
1
I
(
γ
I
∑
i=1
zi 
I
∑
i=1
v

zi
θi

 
I 1
∑
i=1
(I  i)

v

zi
θi

  v

zi
θi+1
)
: (67)
By (64) and (67), the social value function reads
W = u(x1;z1;θ1)
I
∑
i=1
λi+
I
∑
i=2
i 1
∑
j=1
λi

v

z j
θ j

  v

z j
θ j+1

;
= u(x1;z1;θ1) I+
I 1
∑
i=1
 
I
∑
j=i+1
λ j
!
v

zi
θi

  v

zi
θi+1

;
=
I
∑
i=1
(
γzi  v

zi
θi

+
 
i 
i
∑
j=1
λ j
!
v

zi
θi

  v

zi
θi+1
)
; (68)
in which v(zI=θI+1) is an arbitrary number.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let zi  gzi (θ ;γ;λ ) and write the rst-order conditions given in Propo-
sition 5 as
γ  1+βi
θi
v0

zi
θi

+
βi
θi+1
v0

zi
θi+1

= 0; i= 1; :::; I 1; (69)
to dene φ γi (zi;γ) = 0: Since v000 > 0 and 0< θi < θi+1;
∂φ γi (zi;γ)
∂ zi
=
βi
θ 2i+1
v00

zi
θi+1

  1+βi
θ 2i
v00

zi
θi

< 0; i= 1; :::; I 1: (70)
By the implicit function theorem, for every γ 2 R++; φ γi (zi;γ) = 0 has a unique solution which
denes zi as a C 1-function zi = ϕγi (γ) ; with derivative
∂gzi (θ ;γ;λ )
∂γ
 dϕ
γ
i (γ)
dγ
=  ∂φ
γ
i (zi;γ)=∂γ
∂φ γi (zi;γ)=∂ zi
= 

∂φ γi (zi;γ)
∂ zi
 1
> 0: (71)
Proof of Proposition 8. Let zi  giz (θ ;γ;λ ) and use (69) to dene φθj (z j;θi+1) = 0 for j =
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1; :::; I 1: Hence,
∂φθi (zi;θi+1)
∂θi+1
=  βi
θ 2i+1

v0

zi
θi+1

+
zi
θi+1
v00

zi
θi+1

< 0; (72)
∂φθi+1 (zi+1;θi+1)
∂θi+1
=
 
1+βi+1
θ 2i+1
!
v0

zi+1
θi+1

+
zi+1
θi+1
v00

zi+1
θi+1

> 0; (73)
∂φθj (z j;θi+1)
∂θi+1
= 0 for j =2 fi; i+1g : (74)
By the implicit function theorem, for every θi+1, i = 1; :::; I  1; φθj (z j;θi+1) = 0 has a unique
solution which denes z j as a C 1-function z j = ϕθj (θi+1) ; with derivative
dϕθj (θi+1)
dθi+1
= ∂φ
θ
j (z j;θi+1)=∂θi+1
∂φθj (z j;θi+1)=∂ z j
: (75)
As ∂φθj (z j;θi+1)=∂ z j  ∂φ γj (z j;γ)=∂ z j < 0 by (70), it follows from (72)(75) that
∂gzj (θ ;γ;λ )
∂θi+1
 dϕ
θ
j (θi+1)
dθi+1
=
8><>:
< 0 if j = i;
> 0 if j = i+1;
= 0 if j =2 fi; i+1g :
(76)
In consequence,
∂T 0 (zi;θi)
∂θi+1
= v
00 (zi=θi)
γθ 2i
∂gzi (θ ;γ;λ )
∂θi+1
> 0; (77)
∂T 0 (zi+1;θi+2)
∂θi+1
=  1
γθ 2i+2
v00

zi+1
θi+2

∂gzi+1 (θ ;γ;λ )
∂θi+1
< 0; (78)
∂T 0 (z j;θ j+1)
∂θi+1
= 0 for j =2 fi; i+1g : (79)
By Proposition 5,
T 0 (zi;θi+1)

1+
1
βi

T 0 (zi;θi) ; i= 1; :::; I 1; (80)
where βi > 0: Therefore, (77) and (78) imply
∂T 0 (zi;θi+1)
∂θi+1
> 0 and
∂T 0 (zi+1;θi+1)
∂θi+1
< 0: (81)
Proof of Proposition 9. Let zi  giz (θ ;γ;λ ) and use (69) to dene 5 to dene φβj (z j;βi) = 0 for
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j = 1; :::; I 1: Since θi < θi+1 and v00 > 0;
∂φβj (z j;βi)
∂βi
=
(
  1θi v0

zi
θi

+ 1θi+1 v
0

zi
θi+1

< 0 if j = i;
0 otherwise.
(82)
By the implicit function theorem, for every θi+1, i = 1; :::; I  1; φβj (z j;βi) = 0 has a unique
solution which denes z j as a C 1-function z j = ϕβj (βi) ; with derivative
dϕβj (βi)
dβi
= ∂φ
β
j (z j;βi)=∂βi
∂φβj (z j;βi)=∂ z j
: (83)
As ∂φβj (z j;βi)=∂ z j  ∂φ γj (z j;γ)=∂ z j < 0 by (70), it follows from (82)(83) that
∂gzj (θ ;γ;λ )
∂βi
 dϕ
β
j (βi)
dβi
(
< 0 if j = i;
= 0 otherwise.
(84)
Proof of Proposition 10. Since βk is increased for all k 2 fi; :::; j 1g and unaltered otherwise,
Proposition 9 implies (48). We then prove (49). By Proposition 2,
xk (z;θ ;γ) =
1
I
"
I
∑
h=1
zh  1γ
I
∑
h=2
(I+1 h)

v

zh
θh

  v

zh 1
θh
#
+
1
γ
k
∑
h=2

v

zh
θh

  v

zh 1
θh

: (85)
For k < i; differentiating (85) and using (48),
dxk (z;θ ;γ)
ds
=
1
I
j 1
∑
h=i

1  1
γθh
v0

zh
θh

+
I h
γ

1
θh+1
v0

zh
θh+1

  1
θh
v0

zh
θh

dzh
ds
=
1
I
j 1
∑
h=i
T 0 (zh;θh)
βh
[βh  I+h] dzhds : (86)
As, for h = 1; :::; j  1; (i) βh > 0, (ii) βh  I+ h < 0 by (28) and (1), (iii) T 0 (zh;θh) > 0 [cf.
(33)] and (iv) dzh=ds< 0; one gets dxk (z;θ ;γ)=ds> 0 for k < i.
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For k  j;
d
ds
(
1
γ
k
∑
h=2

v

zh
θh

  v

zh 1
θh
)
=
1
γ
j 1
∑
h=i

1
θh
v0

zh
θh

  1
θh+1
v0

zh
θh+1

dzh
ds
(87)
=
j 1
∑
h=i
T 0 (zh;θh)αh
dzh
ds
=
j 1
∑
h=i
T 0 (zh;θh)
βh
dzh
ds
: (88)
This additional term is added to (86) to get
dxk (z;θ ;γ)
ds
=
1
I
j 1
∑
h=i
T 0 (zh;θh)
βh
[βh+h]
dzh
ds
: (89)
As, for h= i; :::; j 1; (i) βh+h= Λ(θh)> 0; (ii) T 0 (zh;θh)> 0 [cf. (33)] and (iii) dzh=ds< 0,
one obtains dxk (z;θ ;γ)=ds< 0 for k  j:
By (15), (50) is a direct implication of (49) and (48).
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